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"Alan W. Richardson's Carnap's Construction of the World" 
                               Erkenntnis (Book Review) 
 
BOOK REVIEW 
Alan W. Richardson, Camap's Construction of the Worid. The Logical 
Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK, 1998, 242 pp., GBP35.00 (cloth). 
 
Even for those who consider the opposition of analytic vs. continental philosophy 
uninteresting or catastrophic for philosophy itself, works such as that of Alan 
Richardson on the history of analytic philosophy can only be welcomed. In this period 
of great methodological confusion (as Richardson says), such works recast the 
fundamental debate on the philosophical and epistemological perspectives on 
science, questioning the "received views" of the philosophical schools. 
 An analysis of the historical emergence of logical empiricism is, as the title reminds 
us, the principal aim of this book. Richardson starts with a methodological premise: it 
is impossible to understand and correctly evaluate logical empiricism without an 
attentive historical reconstruction of the epistemological problems to which logical 
empiricism was supposed to be a solution. 
    The historical reconstruction is guided, in Richardson's work, by a main thesis: the 
epistemological project, from which logical empiricism emerged, has to be 
disconnected from Russell’s empiricist and reductionist project. Camap's logical 
empiricism has to be situated in the field of the Austro-German neo-Kantian 
epistemological tradition as the centrality of the notion of structure and the pre-
eminence of the subjective/objective problematic in the Aufbau show. 
    The proof of this thesis is organized in three steps. 
     The first step consists of pointing out a fundamental tension in the Aufbau 
concerning the notion of structure. This last notion is at the same time used as the 
result of a purely definite and explicit description of the relations between the objects 
of science, and as the main way of objectifying the subjective through the 
characterization of the formal features of subjective experience (chaps. 2 and 3).  
The second step explains this tension in the light of the neo-Kantian epistemological 
debate and shows how the main themes of this debate were central to Camap's 
works before the Aufbau (chaps. 4 to 7). 
   The third step shows how logical empiricism is the way out of the Aufbau tension. 
Richardson explains that the epistemological project of the Aufbau was unstable in 
considering epistemology itself as a formal or empirical science. Camap's works after 
the Aufbau show how he turned more and more clearly towards the first option. The 
analysis of what was published by Camap after the Aufbau and before the semantical 
turn shows how the task of epistemology is indicated to be essentially logical. 
    According to Richardson, one philosopher is mainly responsible for erroneously 
connecting Camap's work to the British empiricist tradition, to which Russell belongs. 
This is Quine, the most famous 'disciple' of Camap. Quine is the main culprit for the 
false received view on logical empiricism that analytic philosophy has endorsed, the 
view according to which Camap was a dogmatic empiricist dressed in the clothes of a 
logician. 
    This point introduces us to the conclusion that Richardson forms from his own 
analysis. The main concern of the book is not merely a restoration of the "truth" about 
what Carnap said. 
    Actually, Richardson wants to leave in doubt the claim that the naturalization of 
epistemology (consequence of the refusal of the analytic/synthetic distinction) is the 
only direction that analytic philosophy can take. Quine's arguments for the refusal of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction are not compelling, mainly because they come from 
a deep misunderstanding of Camap's own project. After having restored this project 
in a new light, Richardson's conclusion is that Camap's conception of the task of 
epistemology is more modem and more instructive for us than Quine's naturalized 
epistemology. 
    The premise and the conclusion of Richardson's argument are interesting and 
stimulating. The main thesis, the neo-Kantian thesis, guiding the whole argument, 
seems to us more problematic. There are certainly neo-Kantian, and indeed 
Cassirerian, influences on Camap's work and Richardson gives an attentive 
reconstruction of those themes in the pre-Aufbau period. What is less convincing is 
the place that Richardson gives to those themes within the very project of the 
Aufbau. There is something lacking in his rational reconstruction of Camap's work 
before 1939: the German logical tradition of Frege and Hilbert which Russell was 
evidently confronted with. The themes of this tradition appear and disappear here 
and there in Richardson's book, but the real weight of its epistemological 
consequences on the nature of logic and mathematics seems misplaced. 
     There are three themes for which this lack is most evident. 
 First,the Fregean discussion of the notion of intuition. Frege in Die 
Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) discussed the notion of Kantian intuition (see for 
example §12, 13, 87, 88, 89). Concerning geometry he thought that there was no 
doubt that geometrical objects were constructed in intuition. On the contrary, 
mathematical objects (that is numbers) are logical objects and they are given to us 
through concepts but without the help of intuition. So, even if wrong about arithmetic, 
Kant has recognised, according to Frege, the real nature of geometrical judgements 
they are synthetic a priori judgements. The young Camap was certainly influenced by 
he who he considered to be his most influential professor. 
 Second, the question of explicit and implicit definitions dealt with by Camap in 
Eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe (1927) and mentioned in §15 of the Aufbau. 
Richardson mentions the logicist tradition and the Principia Mathematica in a general 
way. There is a most direct influence of Frege on that question and Camap's 
arguments are in many respects identical to Fregean arguments against Hilbert's 
implicit definitions.  
Third, the status of the notions of object and concept in the Aufbau, very briefly 
discussed by Richardson in note 4 of Chapter 1. Concerning logic (and then 
mathematics) Frege had substituted for the Kantian triplets concept/intuition/object, 
the categorial opposition object/function. 
The opposition concept/object was a special case of the latter. Using Rus- 
sell's work on definite descriptions and the consequent no-class theory, Camap 
rejects the opposition, reducing it to a simple functional one, but in so doing he goes 
further than Russell. For Russell there are fundamental objects, namely sense data. 
For Camap there are no objects at ail, at least in the sense that the distinction 
object/concept is just a matter of pragmatic choice. That clearly means that when we 
talk of experience we are not talking of phenomenalist objects nor of physicalist ones, 
but rather of something which has no proper internal structure. Only language (and 
 so logic which is nothing but language) can structure experience. The possibility of 
translation from a constitution having a phenomenalist base to a constitution having a 
physicalist one, is just the main proof of the unstructured nature of experience. How 
far that is from the neo-Kantian idea, that we determine objects as objects of 
knowledge through the ideal (and not just symbolic) relations that each object has 
with all the others in a structure, seems evident. It is certainly tempting to consider 
the idea of the possibility of translation inspired by the neo-Kantian idea of invariance 
through changes of structure. Nevertheless what we get from translation in Camap is 
an unstructured empirical content and what structures it are not categories of 
knowledge but only categories of language. '- 
All this would be just a list of bumptious remarks, if these considerations had no 
influence on the interpretation of the key point in Richardson’ s argument: the 
interpretation of the tension, in the Aufbau, between the guiding methodology of the 
first section (the one dealing with the construction of qualities) and the guiding 
methodology of the second section (the one dealing with the constitution of physical 
objects). 
    Richardson characterizes the Aufbau project as the problem of determining how 
we achieve objective knowledge in science despite the subjective origin of empirical 
knowledge in private sensation. The crux of Camap's answer to this question is, 
according to Richardson that all streams experience have a common logical form. 
This is what Richardson calls the structural account of objectivity. He then indicates 
two distinct methodological attempts to produce this account. He calls the first the 
project of purely definite descriptions and the second the intersubjectivistic project. 
    In the first project a logical notion of structure is at work with the whole apparatus 
of the Principia Mathematica and with the official logicist engagement to give only 
explicit definitions. These are the methodological principles to which the first part of 
the constitution, that concerning qualities, conforms. In the second project a scientific 
notion of structure is at work. The methodological principles here are not to be taken 
from logic but from the mathematized sciences such as physics. The second part of 
the constitution, that concernig physical objects, conforms to these principles.  
Richardson is certainly right in pointing out that the second project is  strictly related 
to Poincaré and Duhem's conceptions of the conventional nature of axioms and 
theorems of physics, as opposed to the qualitative nature of experience. He is 
certainly also right in stressing that Camap was so unworried about mixing the two 
different projects (the project of purely definite descriptions and the intersubjectivistic 
project) into the same constitutional enterprise since he was hiding ail problems 
behind the ambiguous notion of convention. In spite of Carnap’s unconcern, the 
ambiguity is clear : in the first project conventions are meant to be void of content, 
just specifications of the meaning of the signs of the constitution, in the second, 
metrical conventions, which allow qualities to be fixed at specific space-temporal 
coordinates, add the necessary structure able to give out objects of physics from 
qualities. Adding this structure, metrical conventions cannot be qualified as void of 
content. 
       What is less convincing is the starting point of Richardson argument. Is the 
central question of the Aufbau the structural account of objectivity? Is Carnap really 
concerned by the Kantian problem of determining the conditions of possibility of 
possibility of objective knowledge from a subjective starting point? 
 
Another line of interpretation is open. The Aufbau was the attempt to form an and-
metaphysical account of the unity of science through formal arguments. What this 
project of constitution needed was simply just the pragmatic choice of the form of the 
point of entrance of experience in the constitution, and then only symbols and 
relations between them (relations that are themselves, in Camap account, nothing 
but symbols). This bold project presupposed the reconciliation between the formalist 
Hilbertian conception of logic and of axiomatic systems, and the Fregean conception, 
with its interdiction of implicit definitions, and its absolute conception of the truth of 
axioms. In spite of Camap's attempt the reconciliation is impossible. 
   As we have mentioned, Richardson's ultimate aim is to leave in doubt the 'dogma' 
of Quinean naturalized epistemology. Camap's very notion of epistemology as a 
formal science and the analytic-synthetic distinction which is one of its central 
features have been misunderstood by Quine. Richardson analysis is convincing. As 
is the fact that the Russellian project of reducing science to acquainted primitives is 
not Camap's project. However Camap's notion of logic, which underlies the notion of 
epistemology as logic of science, is untenable, and Quine saw that clearly. 
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